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I. INTRODUCTION
The issue of trade in South America was very much in the
diplomatic forefront in 1997. The success of the Southern
Common Market' (MERCOSUR) comprising Argentina, Brazil,
Paraguay and Uruguay seemed to suggest the possibility that the
region could become a relatively formidable trading bloc. In
response to the promise of MERCOSUR, President Clinton
pressed Congress for fast-track authority to enable him to
negotiate free trade deals in South America with the goal of
eventually creating a 34-member Free Trade Area of the
Americas (FTAA). Visiting Brazil and Argentina in October
1997, President Clinton seemed to smooth the way for future free
trade deals with MERCOSUR members. Such deals seemed vital
to the United States because there was some fear that it might
get shut out of its own backyard, as the rest of the industrialized
world seemed to be securing trade agreements with
MERCOSUR.' In the end, Congress denied President Clinton
1. Treaty Establishing a Common Market, Mar. 26, 1991, 30 I.L.M. at 1041
[hereinafter MERCOSUR]. Referred to in Spanish as Mercado Comdn del Sur.
2. See Stephen Guynn & Emeric Lepoutre, Doing Business with Mercosur, South
America's Common Market, 217 N.Y. L.J. 1, 7 (1997) (describing visits by Chancellor Kohl
and President Chirac to South America just prior to President Clinton).
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fast track authority, dimming the prospect of an FTAA, at least
in the short term.
Aside from its political dimension, a regional trading
arrangement like MERCOSUR raises a number of economic
concerns. For example, such arrangements often erect
discriminatory trade barriers that may cause imports from
member countries to supplant imports from more efficient non-
member countries.' This phenomenon-referred to as trade
diversion-may tend to reduce social welfare due to higher prices
and the inefficient allocation of resources. Despite these possible
drawbacks, a customs union also has the potential to create trade
in a number of ways. First, if a customs union results in overall
reductions in tariff and non-tariff barriers, it will likely stimulate
trade among members and non-members alike. Second, regional
integration, economic liberalization and harmonization of
macroeconomic policies could provide a more certain and stable
economic system and thereby foster trade. Finally, in industries
characterized by economies of scale, the creation of a customs
union may allow producers in member countries to achieve
efficient levels of production that were previously unattainable.
Thus, any assessment of the social welfare effect of a customs
union must balance these benefits of trade creation against the
costs of trade diversion.
This article considers this cost-benefit analysis in the context
of MERCOSUR's automotive industry. The automotive industry
is especially informative for the following reasons: (1) it
constitutes about one-third of all MERCOSUR exports; (2) its
exports have grown the most rapidly under MERCOSUR; (3)
both Brazil and Argentina consider the industry vital to their
long-term economic interests; and (4) it has raised serious
concerns among countries outside MERCOSUR. Part II first
provides background material on MERCOSUR and a general
overview of its structure. Part III considers MERCOSUR's
3. See ALEXANDER YEATS, THE WORLD BANK, POLICY RESEARCH WORKING PAPER
No. 1729, DOES MERCOSUR'S TRADE PERFORMANCE RAISE CONCERNS ABOUT THE EFFECTS
OF REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS? 1 (1997). A leaked copy of this study generated
significant controversy which culminated in a request by the Brazilian government that
the study not be published under the auspices of the World Bank. See Mary Anastasia
O'Grady, Brazil Wants a World Bank Critic of MERCOSUR Silenced, WALL ST. J., Nov.
22, 1996, at A15. Although Brazil did not get its way, the study was published with the
explicit caveat that the author was not certain whether trade policy had reduced social
welfare. YEATS, supra, at Summary Findings.
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overall trade performance. Part IV provides a theoretical
framework for analyzing a customs union and measuring
revealed comparative advantage, while Part V reports empirical
results. Part VI interprets the empirical results in light of the
structure of tariff and non-tariff barriers in MERCOSUR
countries, as well as the structure of the automotive industry.
Finally, the article concludes with a discussion of the policy
implications and an assessment of the future of MERCOSUR in
light of the region's political economy.
II. MERCOSUR DEFINED
A. Background of MERCOSUR
MERCOSUR was created by the Treaty of Asunci6n signed
on March 26, 1991.' The Treaty of Asunci6n was amended once
in the Additional Protocol of the Treaty of Asunci6n, known as
the Protocol of Ouro Preto, which was signed on December 17,
1994.5 The Protocol of Ouro Preto deals mostly with institutional
issues and dispute settlement and gives MERCOSUR a "distinct
international legal personality."6  More recently, Chile and
Bolivia became associate members on October 1, 1996, and
March 1, 1997, respectively!
In establishing MERCOSUR, the members had a number of
goals: the free movement of goods and services, capital and labor;
elimination of customs tariffs and non-tariff barriers and the
establishment of a common external tariff; the adoption of a
common trade policy; and the coordination of macroeconomic
policies.'
Initially, there was some skepticism about the feasibility of
MERCOSUR because its parties had pursued regional
4. MERCOSUR, supra note 1, 30 IL.M. 1041.
5. Additional Protocol to the Treaty of Asunci6n on the Institutional Structure of
MERCOSUR, Dec. 17, 1994,34 I.L.M. 1244 (1995) [hereinafter Protocol of Ouro Puerto).
6. See SAM LAIRD, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, STAFF WORKING PAPER TPRD-97-
002, MERCOSUR: OBJECTIVES AND ACHREVEMNTS 3 (1997).
7. Guynn & Lepoutre, supra note 2, at 1.
8. See Roberto Bouzas, MERCOSUR y Liberalizacion Comercial Preferencial en
America del Sur: Resultados, Temas y Proyecciones, in NAFTA Y MERCOSUR: UN




integration unsuccessfully in the past.9 Countries pursuing
regional integration in the past, most notably Brazil, took the
view that protecting infant industries from competition was
necessary to achieve economies of scale and efficiency. Thus,
there is some concern that MERCOSUR is simply import
substitution policy all over again, only on a larger scale.'0 On the
other hand, many argue that comparisons to prior import
substitution policies are not appropriate because MERCOSUR
was created as part of a significant economic liberalization
program." Whether economic liberalization would have been
possible without a customs union, i.e., could the MERCOSUR
countries have simply opened their markets without giving each
other preferential access?, will be discussed in Part VII infra.
B. Structure of MERCOSUR
MERCOSUR is an international treaty that establishes
intergovernmental bodies. The Protocol of Ouro Preto
establishes the institutional structure of MERCOSUR in Chapter
I as follows: (i) Council of the Common Market (which consists of
Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Ministers of Economy); (ii)
Common Market Group (which consists of four representatives
from each country and must include representatives of the
Ministries of Foreign Affairs, the Ministries of Economy and the
Central Bank); (iii) MERCOSUR Trade Commission; (iv) Joint
Parliamentary Commission; (v) Economic-Social Consultative
Forum; and (vi) MERCOSUR Administrative Secretariat. 2
The Council of the Common Market is the only body with the
legal authority to negotiate and sign agreements on behalf of
MERCOSUR." The Common Market Group provides oversight
of the management of MERCOSUR through trimestrial
meetings." The Trade Commission coordinates trade policy and
9. See Joseph Grunwald, The Rocky Road Toward Hemispheric Economic
Integration: A Regional Background with Attention to the Future in THE ENTERPRISE FOR
THE AMERICAS INITIATIVE: ISSUES AND PROSPECTS FOR A FREE TRADE AGREEMENT IN THE
WESTERN HEMISPHERE 123 (Roy E. Green ed., 1992).
10. See YEATS, supra note 3, at 28.
11. See, e.g., LAIRD, supra note 6, at 2; see also Miguel Rodriguez Mendoza, Which
Mercosur?, LATINFIN., Jan.-Feb. 1997, at 70.
12. Protocol of Ouro Puerto, supra note 5, 34 I.L.M. at 1244-55.
13. Id. art. 8, 34 I.L.M. at 1249.
14. Id. art. 14, 34 I.L.M. at 1250-51.
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the implementation of the common external tariff.1 The other
bodies are largely consultative."
C. The Common External Tariff
Under Article 5 of MERCOSUR, tariffs were to be reduced in
a progressive, linear and automatic manner and non-tariff
barriers (NTBs) eliminated with the goal of zero tariffs and no
NTBs by the end of 1994."7 Article 5 also called for the
application of a common external tariff (CET) to encourage the
foreign competitiveness of members." Table 119 shows the
current tariff structure and target CET for selected goods.
The effect of the CET has been somewhat limited because
Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay were each granted 300
exceptions to the CET while Paraguay was granted 399
exceptions." The exceptions allow member countries to impose a
tariff that is higher or lower than the CET for specific products
over a limited period of time. Tariffs on these excepted goods
must converge to the CET in a linear and automatic manner by
January 2001 for Argentina and Brazil and by 2006 for Uruguay
and Paraguay.2 Thus, as Table 1 shows, Brazil must lower its
manufacturing tariff from 12.3% to 11.5% on average, while
Paraguay will have to raise its tariff.
Another notable feature of the CET is that it escalates as
goods move up the value chain. Average tariffs apply as follows:
6.3% for raw materials (1st stage of processing); 9.1% for semi-
manufactured goods and goods used as inputs for other products;
and 12.5% for fully processed goods. Among MERCOSUR
countries, Brazil currently has the most pronounced escalation
for processed goods."
15. Id. art. 19, 34 I.L.M. at 1252.
16. See generally, id. ch. I, 34 I.L.M. at 1244-55.
17. MERCOSUR, supra note 1, art. 5(a), 30 I.L.M. at 1045.
18. Id. art. 5(c), 30 L.L.M. at 1046.
19. See Table 1 infra Appendix Part A-
20. See WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, WT/COMTDIIIAdd.4, SOUTHERN COMMON
MARKET (MERCOSUR) AGREEMENT: QUESTIONS AND REPLIES, ADDENDUM 2 (1996).
21. LAIRD, supra note 6, at 7.
22. Brazil imposes an average tariff of nearly 15% on folly processed goods. See
LAIRD, supra note 6, at 11.
[Vol. 30:2
MERCOSUR'S AUTO INDUSTRY
D. Moving Beyond a Customs Union
Although MERCOSUR is currently a customs union, its
members appear to have greater aspirations for cooperation and
coordination. In particular, members have expressed a desire to
move toward a common market that would allow for the free
movement of labor and capital.23 In addition, members have
discussed the coordination of policy issues beyond the CET to
address problem areas such as inflation, foreign investment and
trade. 4
Moreover, MERCOSUR members believe the union provides
political and security benefits and consider their cooperation a
bulwark against political instability and any non-democratic
impulses. The rationale is that by making the countries
interdependent with respect to trade and macroeconomic policy-
making, any non-democratic impulses will be kept in check. This
democratic stabilization rationale seems legitimate in light of
MERCOSUR's response to the political crisis in Paraguay in
1996 when, faced with the threat of a military takeover of
Paraguay's government, the four MERCOSUR presidents met
and approved the "democratic clause," establishing respect for
democratic institutions as a required condition for membership
in MERCOSUR."5 However, despite the grandiose rhetoric of
extensive cooperation, it would be premature to conclude that
MERCOSUR will become more than a trade agreement.
III. MERCOSUR's TRADE PERFORMANCE
As Table 22" shows, trade among MERCOSUR members and
with non-members has grown tremendously over the last five
years or so. Exports from MERCOSUR countries grew to $70
billion in 1995-an increase of more than 50% from 1991 to 1995.
In addition, the share of exports going to MERCOSUR members
nearly doubled from 11% in 1991 to 20.5% in 1995. Moreover,
imports grew at an even faster rate--about 135% over the 1991-
23. Id. at 24.
24. See id. at 23.
25. See Paraguay: What a Choice, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 13-19, 1997, at 33-34; see
also Embassy of Uruguay, What we want to Know, Need to Ask and Should Learn About
Mercosur (visited Mar. 24, 1999) <http://embassy.org/uruguaylecon/mercosur/merc-
003.html>.
26. See Table 2 infra Appendix Part A.
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95 period-and surpassed exports for the first time in 1994. In
total, MERCOSUR trade grew by almost 90% from 1991 to 1995.
It can also be inferred from Table 2 that MERCOSUR now
has a trade deficit with the rest of the world. In 1991, it exported
about $12 billion more than it imported, while in 1995 it
imported about $1 billion more than it exported.
The remarkable extent to which MERCOSUR members have
become more integrated with each other and the rest of the world
is more readily apparent from the World Bank rate of integration
indicator in Table 327. This indicator is calculated by taking the
difference between the rate of growth of total trade and the rate
of growth of gross domestic product (GDP). Growth in trade that
exceeds growth in GDP suggests that a country or region is
becoming more integrated. In the 1980s, growth in trade among
MERCOSUR countries only marginally exceeded GDP growth
(i.e., rate of integration of 2.4). However, in the 1991-95 period,
MERCOSUR's rate of integration increased tenfold or 929%
which reflects the substantial increase in overall trade among
members. However, MERCOSUR's rate of integration with the
rest of the world grew even faster in percentage terms (1122%).
This reflects the great extent to which markets were closed to the
rest of the world prior to 1991. These indicators confirm that
MERCOSUR and the concomitant liberalization of trade in South
America has created trade.
IV. CALCULATING COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE
It is well established that economists have identified the
potential for customs unions to divert trade from more efficient to
less efficient producers."8 In the case of MERCOSUR, there is
some concern that discriminatory trade barriers deny consumers
access to higher quality, lower cost goods. 9 Thus, consumers in a
customs union may end up paying more for goods than they
otherwise would under a free trade regime.
Aside from its potential effects on consumer welfare, this
trade diversion may also encourage continued inefficiencies in
production because inefficient member producers do not receive
27. See Table 3 infra Appendix Part A.
28. See generally JAMES E. MEADE, PROBLEMS OF ECONOMIC UNION (1953).
29. See YEATS, supra note 3, at 30.
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the correct market signals. Rather than being forced to either
become more efficient or shut down, these producers have the
incentive only to keep their costs below non-member costs
adjusted upward for tariff and non-tariff barriers. For example,
all else equal, a 50% tariff will allow a local producer to be
competitive with foreign producers as long as the local producer's
marginal cost is no more than 50% higher than its foreign
competitor's marginal cost. On the other hand, perhaps the
creation of a substantial market for output has allowed
automobile producers in Brazil and Argentina to finally achieve
long-sought economies of scale and competitiveness. In short, the
important question is whether the producers are competitive
relative to the rest of the world's auto producers, i.e., do
MERCOSUR's auto producers have a comparative advantage?
The law of comparative advantage is one of the most
fundamental and widely accepted findings in the area of
international trade economics." Briefly, it stands for the
proposition that countries should export those goods which they
can most cheaply produce relative to other countries. As a
corollary, countries should import those goods for which their
relative costs are higher than the costs of their trading partners.
However, testing these theoretical findings empirically is difficult
because comparative advantage can almost never be measured
directly." Nonetheless, economists have developed indirect
methods of measuring revealed comparative advantage (RCA)
using data on import and export flows.3"
This Article considers two trade-based measures of revealed
comparative advantage: net export ratio and export-based
revealed comparative advantage analysis.
30. See generally JAMES E. MEADE, TRADE AND WELFARE: THE THEORY OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY (1955).
31. Testing the theory empirically would require an analysis of relative prices under
autarky, which are not available for countries engaged in international trade. See DAVID
GREENAWAY & CHRIS MILNER, TRADE AND INDUSTRIAL POLICY IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES: A MANUAL OF POLICY ANALYSIS 181 (1993).
32. See generally UNITED NATIONS INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION,
INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE IN MANUFACTURING: CHANGING PROFILES OF
RESOURCES AND TRADE 4 (1986) [hereinafter UNIDO]. Other measures of revealed
comparative advantage can be generated based on production and consumption statistics
or prices adjusted for the level of domestic subsidies. For a discussion of the latter, see
GREENAWAY & MILNER, supra note 31, at 188-93.
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A. Net Export Ratio
Net Export Ratio (NER) looks at net exports as a proportion
of total trade.33 It can be calculated by dividing the difference
between exports and imports of a product by the sum of the
exports and imports of the product.4
A few points about this ratio should be noted. First,
arithmetic dictates that it vary from -1 to +1. Second, the closer
the ratio is to 1, the more it reveals a comparative advantage.
On the other hand, as the ratio gets closer to -1, a greater
comparative disadvantage is revealed. Values for this ratio
around zero are ambiguous. 5 Third, NER assumes that there are
no tariff or non-tariff barriers distorting trade flows. For
example, a country could achieve NER of 1 by simply banning
imports. Of course, we could hardly conclude under these
circumstances that a country had a comparative advantage.
Finally, the NER in this paper will exclude intra-MERCOSUR
exports and imports from its analysis because trade within
MERCOSUR is, by definition, governed by preferential
arrangements. Thus, if we want to measure revealed
comparative advantage vis-A-vis other world producers, only
those trade flows that do not reflect preferential arrangements
should be included. For example, an export from Brazil to
Argentina would not meet the test of the marketplace in the
33. See GREENAWAY & MILNER, supra note 31.
34. The formula is as follows:
NER = x 2 - T)
where xi, = exports of good j by country or region i
mij = imports of good j by country or region i
Id.
35. It should be noted that this index is limited for goods in which there is little
trade volume. In such cases, economists normalize for the relative importance of trade
flows. See, e.g., Juergen B. Donges & James Riedel, The Expansion of Manufactured
Goods in Developing Countries: An Empirical Assessment of Supply and Demand Issues,
113 WELTWiRTsCHAFTLIcHEs ARcHIv 58-87 (1977).
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same way that an export to the United States would because of
the lower tariffs facing Brazilian exporters to Argentina. 36
B. Export-Based Revealed Comparative Advantage
Analysis
Another approach to measuring revealed comparative
advantage is export-based revealed comparative advantage
analysis (ESR) which compares a country's share of the world
export market for a particular good with its share of the export
market for all goods or goods of a certain type.37
The intuition behind this formulation is quite
straightforward: as a country's share of world exports of a good
grows larger relative to its share of aggregate world exports, this
reveals a comparative advantage in the production of that good.
Unlike the NER, the ESR is always greater than zero, though it
does not have an upper bound. An ESR less than 1 means that a
country's share of world exports in a particular good is smaller
than the country's share of all exports or all exports of a certain
type and reveals a comparative disadvantage. On the other
hand, as the ESR increases, more of a comparative advantage is
revealed. It should be noted that the choice of what goods to
aggregate for purposes of calculating a country's world share of
36. See YEATS, supra note 3, at 12.
37. See Bela Balassa, The Changing Pattern of Comparative Advantage in
Manufactured Goods, 61 REV. ECON. & STAT. 259-66 (1979). See also, YEATS, supra note
3, at 11-13. This export share ratio (ESR) can be expressed through the following formula:
ESR- wJ
/.wJ
where xi, = exports of good j from country or region i
x . = world exports of good j
1999]
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aggregate exports can be potentially important, particularly for
small countries. For example, a small country with a negligible
share of total world trade that concentrates on exports of a few
traditional exports may show extremely high levels of
comparative advantage." However, MERCOSUR's non-
negligible share of world trade will permit aggregation over all
goods.
V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS FOR MERCOSUR's AUTOMOTIVE
INDUSTRY
One of the main concerns raised by a customs union is
whether its preferential trading arrangements divert trade away
from non-members and back toward members. Thus, in the
context of MERCOSUR, it is important to know whether its
reduced tariffs have diverted trade. To answer this question in
the context of the auto industry, this Article considers two
sectors: passenger automobiles and automobile parts and
accessories. 9
Figure 1' shows the rapid growth in intra-MERCOSUR
exports that occurred from 1991 to 1996-a 400% increase.41 At
first blush, Figure 1 seems to suggest that extra-MERCOSUR
exports were diverted to members. However, 1991 was the first
year in which MERCOSUR's trading preferences were in place.
Thus, the decline in exports to non-MERCOSUR countries prior
to 1991 cannot be explained by MERCOSUR's trading regime.
Exports to non-members have actually remained stable at about
$250 million over the 1991-96 period, while intra-MERCOSUR
exports have climbed to $1.2 billion.4 2 Total exports thus have
grown 250% from 1991 to 1996." This growth was possible due
See GREENAWAY & MILNER, supra note 31.
38. See GREENAWAY & MILNER, supra note 31, at 186.
39. All the data in this paper were generated using the Standard International
Trade Classification (SITC) Codes, Revision 3 for automobiles and automobile parts &
accessories, which are 781 and 784, respectively. SlTC Codes are available at the United
Nations Computing Centre web site, <gopher://gopher.unicc.org:70/00/itc/dir3/dir3l/
file313.txt,.
40. See Figure 1 infra Appendix Part B.
41. Growth was computed by the author using data available from the Inter-
American Development Bank, Intal Database (on file with author) [hereinafter Intal
Database].




to increases in capacity-for example Brazil and Argentina have
increased their production of automobiles by 69% and 105%,
respectively." Thus, Brazilian and Argentine automobile
producers are selling most of their products at home and in
markets while exporting slightly less than the pre-MERCOSUR
value to non-members.
While exports are an important indicator of competitiveness,
they tell only part of the story. Specifically, the issue is whether
the tremendous increase in intra-MERCOSUR exports has come
at the expense of imports. Figure 2 shows that imports have
gained significant access to markets. Imports of automobiles
from non-MERCOSUR producers account for more than 60% of
all imports."6 In fact, the tremendous increase in imported autos
into MERCOSUR is perhaps more noteworthy than the increase
in intra-MERCOSUR trade. The value of imported autos into
MERCOSUR increased about 500% to about $1.9 billion over the
1991-96 period. 7 This represents a remarkable change from the
late 1980s when tariff and non-tariff barriers kept all but a small
number of imported automobiles out of countries. Therefore, to
the extent that MERCOSUR was responsible for opening its
members' auto markets, significant trade was created. Overall
trade in automobiles increased about 380% to $3.6 billion from
1991 to 1996.48
A. MERCOSUR's Trade in Passenger Vehicles
To determine whether passenger automobile producers are
competitive relative to world producers, net trade flows for the
period 1987-96 are informative. These net trade flows are
examined in Table 4." As discussed above, the export and import
figures reflect extra-MERCOSUR trade only, though it should be
noted that including intra-MERCOSUR trade flows would only
dampen, and would not substantially change, the following
observed trends."0
44, See ASOCIACION DE FABRiCAS DE AUTOMORES 194-96, 200-203 (1996)
[hereinafter ASSOCIATION OF AUTOMOBILE MANUfACTURERSI,
45. See Figure 2 infra Appendix Part B.
46. Calculated using data available from Intal Databse, supra note 41.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See Table 4 infra Appendix Part A.
50. This is because any inflation of exports through intra-MERCOSUR exports
19991
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First, as shown in Table 4, MERCOSUR's NER for the late
1980s was close to 1 which would normally suggest a strong
comparative advantage in the production of automobiles.
However, this surplus merely reflects how heavily protected
South America's auto industry was in the late 1980s.
Second, starting in 1991, MERCOSUR has seen its NER
continue to decline, as more exports went to members and fewer
to non-members. The lowest NER for the period, -0.89 in 1995,
suggests a severe comparative disadvantage. The increase in
NER to -0.76 is largely explained by the increase in the Brazilian
duty on imported autos from 32% to 70% in 1995. 5' Thus, the
opening of the automobile markets in MERCOSUR countries has
revealed that its producers are not cost competitive with foreign
producers.
This revealed comparative disadvantage can be confirmed by
considering the ESR which, as discussed above, looks only at
export performance in an industry relative to overall export
performance. Table 55" shows that MERCOSUR's share of world
automobile exports remains well below its share of overall
exports. For example, as shown in Table 5, in 1995, MERCOSUR
exported only 0.33% of the world's auto exports", while, at the
same time, accounting for 1.39% of all world exports. Indeed,
MERCOSUR's ESR has steadily declined since 1992 and stood at
only 0.24 in 1995. This low ESR confirms MERCOSUR's
comparative disadvantage relative to foreign producers.
Disaggregated results for Brazil and Argentina are reported
in Table 614. Although both countries have developed trade
deficits with foreign producers, there are significant differences
between their respective industries.
In the case of Brazil, some conclusions can be drawn about
the competitiveness of Brazilian automobile producers after the
founding of MERCOSUR and trade liberalization in the early
1990s. Brazil's trading deficit and NER with non-member
countries for the period 1994-96-approximately $2.5 billion-
would be balanced by intra-MERCOSUR imports.
51. Calculated using data available from Intal Databse, supra note 41.
52. See Table 5 infra Appendix Part A-
53. MERCOSUR's export figures are actually inflated because they include intra-
MERCOSUR exports. Thus, these calculations are quite conservative.
54. See Table 6 infra Appendix Part A.
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suggests that Brazilian producers are at a comparative
disadvantage relative to foreign producers. This conclusion is
buttressed by the fact that imports poured into Brazil after it
decreased the effective rate of protection5 for automobiles to 45%
in the period 1992-94. 1 Thus, one could conclude that foreign-
produced automobiles must be lower cost because they competed
favorably with Brazilian cars even at relatively high, albeit
historically lower, rates of protection.5 7 The decrease in NER
from 1995 to 1996 is likely explained largely by Brazil's
unilateral increase in tariffs on imported automobiles of up to
70%58, as imports fell by 64% 9 in response to the higher tariff.
Thus, if the reduction in net export deficit for 1996 was simply a
distortion in a trend toward greater import share of the Brazilian
market, then one could conclude that Brazilian auto-makers are
not internationally competitive. A more complete discussion of
the competitiveness of the Brazilian auto sector is found in
Section VI.B infra.
It is important to note that Brazil's revealed comparative
disadvantage cannot be explained simply by the relative
attractiveness of exporting to members. In other words, it is not
that Brazil auto-makers could export more automobiles to non-
members but instead opt for the higher profit margins in their
own market and MERCOSUR markets. Rather, MERCOSUR
seems to be virtually the only place where Brazilian automobiles
can compete.' The response of Brazilian auto makers to the
virtual collapse of the Brazilian automobile market in late 1997
confirms this lack of competitiveness. Instead of exporting the
excess capacity abroad, the major manufacturers in Brazil simply
chose to shut down their factories.6 1
55. In addition to tariffs, this figure includes non-tariff barriers including
investment incentives such as favorable tax treatment.
56. LAIRD, supra note 6, at 13.
57. This conclusion depends on the crucial assumption that the prices of foreign-
produced automobiles do not reflect subsidies at home. Thus, to the extent that foreign
producers receive financial incentives through programs such as export credits or
investment tax breaks at home, the conclusion is weakened and depends on the size of
such subsidies.
58. Finance and Economics: Murky Mercosur; Trade Agreements, THE ECONOMIST,
July 26, 1997, available in 1997 WL 13361122.
59. Calculated using data available from Intal Databse, supra note 41.
60. Brazil does export a significant number of light commercial vehicles to Europe,
particularly Italy. See ASSOCIATION OF AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURERS, supra note 44, at
203.
61. See Trouble in El Dorado, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 13, 1997, at 57.
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The trade data in Table 6 permit stronger conclusions to be
drawn about the Argentine automobile industry. Argentina's
numbers after 1991 reflect the reduction in tariff--down to 11%
by 1996-and NTBs that took place in the 1990-91 period. Thus,
with its automobile market open, at least partially, for the first
time, Argentina saw its net export deficit soar to $1.4 billion and
its NER fall to -0.947. Over the period 1992-95, Argentina had a
net export deficit of $3.4 billion and an average NER of -0.91.
These numbers reveal a strong comparative disadvantage in the
production of automobiles relative to foreign producers. In effect,
nearly all (95% in 1995) of Argentina's exports of automobiles go
to MERCOSUR members, particularly Brazil (90% in 1995)
under their preferential trading arrangements. Thus,
MERCOSUR has effectively created an export market for
Argentine automobiles that did not exist previously.
The foregoing examination of net trade flows and
MERCOSUR's declining NER and ESR reveals a lack of
international competitiveness in the passenger vehicles sector.
B. MERCOSUR's Trade in Automobile Parts and
Accessories
MERCOSUR's performance in the automobile parts and
accessories (P&A) sector also reveals a lack of international
competitiveness. However, its performance relative to the rest of
the world's producers has been better than that of the automobile
industry. Unlike the automobile industry, the P&A sector never
exhibited substantial net export surpluses because it has always
been less protected than the automobile sector." The largest
such surplus-an NER of .25-occurred in 1989.64
Following trade liberalization and MERCOSUR's founding in
1991, the parts and accessories industry exported about as much
as it imported, i.e., its NER hovered around zero. 5 As noted
above, this NER suggests neither comparative advantage nor
disadvantage. However, more recently, MERCOSUR's trade
performance has not kept pace with its foreign competitors.
62. Calculated using data available from Intal Databse, supra note 41.
63. Imports of parts and accessories were vital to support the main industrial policy
goal of encouraging automobile production.
64. See Table 7 infra Appendix Part A-
65. See Table 8 infra Appendix Part A.
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From 1993-96, foreign producers nearly doubled their imports to
MERCOSUR, while exports grew by only about 20%." With an
average NER of about -0.16 over the 1994-96 period,
MERCOSUR producers would seem to be at a slight comparative
disadvantage relative to their foreign counterparts. Interpreting
these data is complicated by the massive restructuring that has
been taking place in the P&A sector. These sectoral changes are
discussed in Section VI.C infra.
Similar to the passenger vehicles sector discussed above,
disaggregating the data by country also reveals some significant
differences between Brazil and Argentina's P&A trade
performance.
In the case of Brazil, as Table 967 shows, its P&A industry
has been much better at exporting products than its Argentine
counterpart. During the 1987-91 period, Brazil tended to export
almost twice as much in value of automobile P&A as it imported,
as its NER was approximately 0.3.68 The NER for this period is
more meaningful than the NER for automobile trade because the
P&A industry was not as heavily protected during this period.
Thus, Brazil's P&A producers had demonstrated some ability to
compete in international markets. MERCOSUR did not affect
the Brazilian P&A industry to the same extent it did the
automobile industry, as the P&A sector maintained a net export
surplus with non-MERCOSUR countries through 1994. In
contrast to auto-makers, Brazilian P&A manufacturers managed
to continue exporting in significant quantities to non-
MERCOSUR countries, even as its exports to MERCOSUR
increased by more than 300% to $500 million over the period.69
Thus, there was remarkable trade creation in this sector-total
trade increased from about $1 billion in 1991 to more than $3
billion in 1996.70
The performance of the P&A industry in Argentina was
weaker than in Brazil. The Argentine P&A industry has never
had a net export surplus in trade, though its NER remained
66. Calculated using data available from Intal Databse, supra note 41.
67. See Table 9 infra Appendix Part A-
68. This NER of 113 implies that exports are twice as large as imports.
Algebraically, this can be shown by simply equating (x-m)/(x+m) to 1/3 and solving for x,
which yields x - 2m.




below -0.5 from 1988-91. Although Argentina's overall trade in
P&A with non-MERCOSUR countries increased about 130%
(from about $190 million to $530 million) over the 1991-96
period, its trade with members increased by more than 900%
(from about $95 million to about $970 million).71 Consequently,
the Argentine industry's total trade with members is nearly
double its trade with the rest of the world. Despite the increased
exports to non-members, these data suggest that Argentine
producers have no comparative advantage.
VI. INTERPRETING MERCOSUR's TRADE PERFORMANCE
The relatively poor showing of exports in world markets
suggests that MERCOSUR automobile producers are at a
comparative disadvantage relative to non-member producers.
The competitive situation for producers of automotive parts and
accessories is better, though it demonstrates no real comparative
advantage. With no comparative advantage, the question then
arises as to why trade in automotive products has increased so
dramatically among members. The simple answer, which will be
explored in greater depth below, is that member exports face zero
or, at least, much lower tariffs and need not match lower cost
foreign producers. On the other hand, this simple story may be
complicated by the structure of the automotive industry and
potential economies of scale.
A. Trade Barriers Facing Foreign Producers
There can be little doubt that the tariff protection afforded
members has altered trade patterns since 1991. After importing
relatively few Brazilian automobiles prior to MERCOSUR,
Argentina is now the primary destination for Brazilian cars."
And the reverse is true for Brazil.73  All else equal, this
remarkable change must reflect a change in relative prices facing
consumers, namely that the prices of Brazilian autos facing
Argentines must have declined and vice versa. Prior to
MERCOSUR one of the largest components of price for imports






tariff barriers. Thus, it can be inferred that post-MERCOSUR
reductions in the cost of these barriers would cause relative
prices to fall. Before reaching that conclusion, however, it is
important to consider the changes that have taken place in the
automotive trade regimes of members.
The automotive industries in Brazil and Argentina have
always been considered vitally important for the economic health
of the two countries. Prior to 1991, Argentina and Brazil
protected their automobile industries by either banning most
imports or achieving the same effect with extraordinarily high
tariffs and NTBs.74 Since 1991, Argentina and Brazil have had
essentially a managed trade in automobiles. Under the Ouro
Preto Agreement in 1994, automobiles were granted special
treatment, and members postponed the establishment of a
common policy on this sector until 1999. Until a common policy
is established, both countries have agreed to recognize each
other's automotive trade regime and have put in place a
Compensated Exchange Regime that allows local manufacturers
to import finished vehicles and components with reduced tariffs
in an amount almost equal to what they export."m
The response of import flows to changes in the tariff
structure in Brazil has been swift and substantial.7  The
reductions in tariffs for imported passenger autos that took place
over the 1991-95 period resulted in an increase in imports of
about 1600% to $3.4 billion. However, in late 1995, Brazil raised
its tariff on automobiles though presidential decree from 32% to
70%.7' At the same time, it adopted fiscal incentives to attract
investments. 8 These measures were likely the main reason for
the 63% decrease in the value of imports in 1996. Eventually,
Brazil was forced to eliminate the quota regime in October 1995
after the World Trade Organization (WTO) balance of payments
74. For example, in Argentina, effective rates of protection were between 100% and
200%. Hernan Carbone & Jonathan Anderson, Argentina: Automotive Industry Overview,
AIWISA, July 2, 1997, available in 1997 WL 9850590.
75. For a detailed description of the automotive industry in Argentina, see id.
76. See Figure 3 infra Appendix Part B.
77. George Kleinfeld & Deborah Wengel, Foreign Investment, 31 INT'L LAW. 403, 407
(1997) (quoting Comments of Honda North America, submitted to the Office of the U.S.
Trade Representative, Docket 301-110, Nov. 8, 1996, at 1).
78. Mario Osava, MERCOSUR: Automobiles at the Heart of the Common Market,
INTER PRESS SERVICE, Feb. 7, 1998, available in 1998 WL 5985725.
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committee rejected Brazil's claim that the regime was necessary
on balance of payments grounds."
Although Brazil's 1995 decree raised tariffs to 70%, it also
provides relief to qualifying producers. Specifically, the decree
allows qualifying producers to receive a reduction in duties of up
to 90% on imports of capital goods and from 85% to 40% on duties
of inputs."0 Moreover, qualifying producers get a 50% reduction
in tariffs on imported vehicles."1 To qualify, a producer must
meet the following criteria: (1) domestic content requirement of
60%; (2) one-to-one ratios of imported capital goods to
domestically produced capital goods and of domestically produced
raw materials to imported raw materials; (3) imports of vehicles
and inputs combined may not exceed its level of net exports; (4)
imports of auto parts may not exceed two-thirds of net exports."2
This preferential arrangement can be enormously profitable for
multinational producers. For example, Ford manufactures car
stereos for export near the Sao Paulo airport and earns the right
to import its high-value European-made automobile models at a
lower tariff.3
These Brazilian automotive investment trade policies have
since come under attack in the WTO under the Agreement on
Trade-Related Investment Measures.' The issues are perhaps
best illustrated by the invited comments made by American auto
makers to the U.S. Trade Representative regarding Brazilian
trade practices in the automotive industry.8 General Motors
(GM), which has substantial manufacturing capacity in Brazil
and qualifies for reduced tariffs under the Brazilian trade
regime, took the view that the regime favored GM and therefore
benefited the United States." In contrast, Honda, which has
79. See OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 1996 INVENTORY OF
FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 24 (1996).
80. Kleinfeld & Wengel, supra note 77, at 406.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See Trouble in El Dorado, supra note 61, at 58.
84. Both the United States and Japan have filed complaints with respect to Brazil's
trade policies in the automotive industry. Kleinfeld & Wengel, supra note 77, at 406.
85. Initition [sic] of Section 302 Investigation and Request for Public Comment;
Practices of the Government of Brazil Regarding Trade and Investment in the Auto
Sector, 61 Fed. Reg. 54,485 (1996).
86. See Comments of General Motors, submitted to the Office of the U.S. Trade




virtually no production capacity in Brazil and instead exports to
Brazil from its Ohio plant, criticized the Brazilian trade regime
for violating "accepted principles of international trade and
investment."87
The most recent agreement between Brazil and Argentina,
signed in January 1996, continues the Compensated Exchange
Regime by allowing for automobiles and parts to be imported
duty free so long as the importer balances these imports with
exports to any destination.88 It also contains a side letter that
calls for the duty-free importation by Brazil of about 85,000 cars
from Argentina between 1996 and 1998 to remedy a trade deficit
of $850 million that had accumulated during the 1992-94
period.8" This agreement clearly favors not only local production
of automobiles but also dual production in Brazil and Argentina
to take advantage of reduced duties and the Compensated
Exchange Regime. This agreement does not seem to affect the
CET and timetable previously agreed upon. Thus, Brazil is
obligated to bring its 70% tariff down to 20% according to the
schedule in Table 1090, while Argentina is obligated to bring its
11% tariff up to 20% by 2000.91 However, auto industry insiders
do not believe that Brazil will ever reach the 20% CET because
its industry will not be competitive at that rate. They instead
believe the CET will be set around 30%. 2
B. The Structure of MERCOSUR's Automotive
Industry
The auto industry in South America was once considered a
"backwater where international car firms assembled hand-me-
down, discarded models from Europe or America." 3 In the 1990s,
however, this backwater became the darling of European and
American multinational car manufacturers. In particular, the
1993-97 period has witnessed tremendous growth in the
automobile industry in both Brazil and Argentina. The
87. See Kleinfeld & Wengel, supra note 77, at 406-407.
88. See WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, TRADE POLICY REVIEW OF BRAZIL 145 (1996).
89. See id.
90. See Table 10 infra Appendix Part A.
91. See Carbone & Anderson, supra note 74, at *5.
92. See WARD'S AUTOMOTIVE Y.B. 98 (1996).
93. See Trouble in El Dorado, supra note 61, at 57.
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automobile industry is composed almost entirely of multinational
companies94 who have invested more than $15 billion over the
1992-97 period."
Brazil has attracted investment in its auto industry. In
addition to the "big four" manufacturers in Brazil- Volkswagen,
Fiat, General Motors and Ford-nearly every major auto maker
including Honda, Toyota, Chrysler, Renault, Peugeot, Asia
Motors, and BMW have either invested in Brazil or have
announced investments." These investments are expected to
expand the industry's production capacity by 25% to 2.5 million
vehicles by the year 2000.97
Argentina's auto industry has also attracted significant
amounts of foreign direct investment (FDI) from foreign auto-
makers since 1991.98 Currently, foreign car manufacturers or
their licensees in Argentina include Volkswagen, Ford, Renault
(through a licensee), Peugeot (through a licensee), General
Motors, and Mercedes Benz.99  In addition, investments by
Chrysler and Toyota have been announced."0 Total FDI in the
automobile sector is expected to exceed $5 billion by the end of
the 1990s.101
For foreign auto makers, the preferential treatment given to
imports by local manufacturers has made dual operation in
Brazil and Argentina the norm."2 The pattern emerging is that
higher valued models are produced in Argentina at lower
volumes while Brazilian plants produce higher volume models."'
For example, Brazil has increased its production of low end
station wagons for export to Argentina, while Argentina has
increased its production of higher-end sedans for export to Brazil.
94. See Table 11 infra Appendix Part A.
95. Trouble in El Dorado, supra note 61, at 58.
96. See Jonathan Wheatley, Multinationals taking over: local manufacturers fight a
losing battle, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1998, at 5.
97. See id.
98. Carbone & Anderson, supra note 74, at *3.
99. Id. at *2.
100. Id.
101. Id. at *3.
102. See Wheatley, supra note 96, at 5. An added, albeit temporary, incentive for
manufacturers to increase capacity in Argentina was Argentina's outstanding trade
deficit with Brazil. Under the terms of the most recent auto agreement between Brazil
and Argentina, Brazil must absorb 85,000 Argentine automobiles by the end of 1998.
LAIRD, supra note 6, at 19.
103. See Wheatley, supra note 96, at 5.
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Thus, local automobile producers have adjusted their production
choices to take advantage of the managed trade regime, as well
as the differential costs of production in Brazil and Argentina.
The changes wrought by the opening of MERCOSUR's
automobile market to foreign producers and the subsequent
competitive pressures on local producers have also rippled
through the automotive P&A industry. There has been
significant FDI and a remarkable restructuring in the P&A
industry in both Brazil and Argentina. In Brazil, most local
producers have either been absorbed by foreign competition or
simply closed their doors."' Whereas Brazil once had more than
1,000 first tier suppliers, it now has about 500, and
knowledgeable observers expect the number to fall to between
200 and 300 by the end of the decade.
This restructuring in the P&A sector is driven largely by two
trends shaping the international market. First, global car
manufacturers now demand "global sourcing," which places
reliance on fewer, more efficient suppliers of standard parts to
factories around the globe.'00  Consequently, auto parts
manufacturers can be competitive only through economies of
scale. Second, automobile manufacturers now require that parts
producers supply more modular units, e.g., completed systems of
components rather than individual components.0 7 The fact that
both trends are playing out in Brazil's P&A sector bodes well for
the sector's future competitiveness. However, the short term will
not be without dislocation costs because acquisitions and closures
will certainly reduce employment in the sector.
C. Economies of Scale and Productivity
The promise of economies of scale and increased factor
productivity has driven industrial and trade policy in South
America since the 1960s. However, achieving economies of scale
against competitors who have already achieved them creates a
bootstrapping kind of problem: economies of scale are only
achievable through large volume; yet, large volume is only
104. See id.
105. See id.
106. See Road kill: Specialized part suppliers are the early fatalities in an evolving car




possible if goods are competitively priced, i.e., if economies of
scale have already been achieved. Even after substantial growth
in production capacity in the 1991-95 period ' , the volume of
automobile production still lags that of foreign producers by
orders of magnitude.
A greater problem facing Brazilian producers is that auto
manufacturing is extremely capital-intensive--about 22% more
capital-intensive than the average for all manufacturing-while
its historical advantage has been in more labor-intensive
sectors."9 The only way out of this predicament is government
subsidization or some other form of protection. Until
liberalization in the early 1990s, Brazil preserved its automobile
market for domestic producers through its high tariffs on
imports."' This protection, however, led to neither economies of
scale nor increased productivity relative to world producers.
Production stagnated at about one million units until 1992 '11, and
productivity significantly lagged that of the world's leading auto
producers, as Brazilian producers had little incentive to adopt
the best practices of foreign producers.1 ' Thus, placing high
tariffs on imports is not a viable option.
The creation of MERCOSUR enlarged the relatively captive
market for both Brazilian and Argentine producers. As Figure
4113 shows, MERCOSUR has increased its production capacity by
about 70% from 1991 to 1995. However, the elimination of
import restrictions and reductions in tariffs and NTBs in the
early 1990s exposed producers to the competitive force of best
practices production for the first time. Assessing the extent to
which producers have responded to this challenge by becoming
more competitive relative to foreign manufacturers is quite
difficult. However, a recent McKinsey study provides some
valuable insights. First, total factor productivity in Brazil's
passenger vehicle sector is about 52% of U.S. levels, while labor
108. See Figure 4 infra Appendix Part B.
109. See ALEXANDER YEATS, THE WORLD BANK, POLICY, PLANNING AND RESEARCH
WORKING PAPER No. 165, SHIFTING PATTERNS OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE:
MANUFACTURED EXPORTS OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1989).
110. See McKinsey Global Institute, Productivity: The Key to an Accelerated
Development Path for Brazil, Sdo Paolo and Washington, D.C. (forthcoming) (manuscript
at 7, on file with the Inter-American Law Review) [hereinafter McKinsey Report].
111. See ASSOCIATION OF AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURERS, supra note 44, at 200.
112. McKinsey Report, supra note 110, at 4-5.
113. See Figure 4 infra Appendix Part B.
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productivity in the Brazilian auto industry stands at about 30%
of U.S. levels and only 21% of Japanese levels."" Second, the
Brazilian auto industry has invested less than half the capital
per employee as has been invested by the United States
industry."'  However, the prospects for auto producers are
potentially bright because foreign competition will continue to
prod local producers to adopt better, more efficient practices
including the use of more automated technology."6  The
McKinsey report concludes that Brazilian producers could
potentially achieve international competitiveness by the time
tariff rates converge to the CET in 2000."'
VII. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
A. Did MERCOSUR Create Any Losers?
Assessing the overall social welfare effects of MERCOSUR in
the automotive industry requires adding up the costs of trade
diversion and comparing them to the benefits of trade creation." '
The analysis above shows that members have increased their
trade with members and non-members alike. Thus, the
treatment of the automotive sector in MERCOSUR (again, to the
extent that it was responsible for economic liberalization) has
increased social welfare. Moreover, if one compares the auto
trade regime with the pre-MERCOSUR regime, rather than with
some free trade counterfactual"9, automotive trade policy may
114. See McKinsey Report, supra note 110, at 4-5. In contrast, capital productivity is
actually 172% that of U.S. producers. Id. As the McKinsey report notes, however, this
higher capital productivity reflects more an under-investment in capital by Brazilian
producers than any superior use of capital. See id.
115. See id. at 14.
116. See id. at 18.
117. Id.
118. This cost-benefit approach implicitly uses the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency criterion,
i.e., are the benefits large enough to compensate for the losses? In other words, the
distribution of the gains does not matter.
119. A more subtle criticism might be that MERCOSUR is not as desirable as a free
trade agreement along the lines of the NAFTA. However, "on welfare grounds, a free
trade arrangement can yield no benefits that are not attainable under a customs union,
and can generate additional welfare costs that are not incurred under customs union."
ANNE 0. KRUEGER, NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, INC. WORKING PAPER
No. 5084, FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS VERSUS CUSTOMS UNIONS 4 (1985). A reason for this
is that a customs union's common external tariff eliminates the need to monitor the
borders among member countries. Id. at 12-17. In contrast, the differential tariffs of the
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actually represent a Pareto-improvement.1 0 To see how this is
possible, the four main constituencies affected by the changes in
the automobile trade regime will be considered: consumers, local
producers, foreign producers, and auto workers.
Considering MERCOSUR's consumers first, there is no
doubt that the opening of the automobile market to imports has
benefited consumers. Car prices have steadily dropped in both
Brazil and Argentina, while selection and quality have
increased.1"' Argentine consumers no longer have to wait months
to take delivery of a car of questionable quality; today, they can
choose from the latest models and drive one off the lot."2 It is
important to note that consumers are not as well off as they
could be because they are still paying more than they would
under a free trade regime. However, consumers are better off
than they would be if the pre-MERCOSUR regime, with its
virtual ban on imports, were still in place.
While the inflow of imports has benefited consumers, the
MERCOSUR regime still protects local producers. 3 In fact,
"Ithe tariff preferences generated by the regional integration
process has heavily benefited the businesses operating in the
region."'24  The Compensated Exchange Regime between
Argentina and Brazil has allowed producers in those countries to
take advantage of the growing demand in each other's markets."2
These producers have also been able to import on more favorable
terms, thus profiting from a kind of tariff arbitrage. In addition,
producers with dual production in Brazil and Argentina have
been able to achieve some second-best efficiencies by altering
their production mix in each country based on relative cost
differences. The gush of investment into MERCOSUR by
multinational auto manufacturers is perhaps the strongest evi-
NAFTA members requires that they monitor goods passing among themselves to make
sure that goods are not simply exported to the member with the lowest tariff for re-export
to the other members. See id.
120. A Pareto-improvement is a change that leaves at least one party better off and
no party worse off. HAL R. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 225 (3d ed. 1992).
121. See Carbone & Anderson, supra note 74, at *15.
122. See id. at *3.
123. Id. at * 14. Local producers is a bit of a misnomer here. The term actually refers






dence that local producers benefit from MERCOSUR's trade
policy.
The picture is not as rosy for foreign producers without
production capacity in MERCOSUR. For example, Japanese
producers have been slow to invest in local production.12 They
have also been perhaps the strongest critics of MERCOSUR'2
These producers clearly would prefer to produce their goods
outside, where their costs are cheaper, and export to
MERCOSUR. Thus, foreign producers with cost advantages
would be better off under a free trade regime. Nonetheless, these
same producers are better off now than they were under pre-
MERCOSUR's virtual ban on imports because at least they can
export some cars.
The last constituency to consider, and it is by no means
unimportant in MERCOSUR countries, is labor. Employment in
the industry has declined steadily since 1990 while output is
increasing, which simply reflects increases in productivity."12
However, real wages in the industry have increased about 22%
since 1990.1" Thus, if the effects of MERCOSUR on labor is
measured solely by total employment, workers as a group were
made worse off by MERCOSUR's trading regime. On the other
hand, if increasing real wages in the industry are instead
considered, workers benefited from the new trade regime.1 °
The liberalization of trade in the automotive sector has had
enormous benefits and relatively minor costs. Gains to
consumers through lower prices and improved quality likely
dwarf any welfare losses to displaced auto workers. Moreover,
local and foreign producers alike are much happier with the
regime than they were with the pre-regime.
126. Trouble in El Dorado, supra note 61, at 58.
127. See Kleinfeld & Wengel, supra note 77, at 406-407. Honda North America,
which has yet to invest in local production and continues to export automobiles from
assembly plants in the United States to Brazil, has criticized Brazilian measures under
MERCOSUR to increase its duty on automobiles and impose additional trade restrictions.
Id.
128. See McKinsey Report, supra note 110, at 2-3, Exhibit 4.
129. Id.
130. In any case, this is not a purely Pareto-improving change because at least one
person (the worker that lost their job) is left worse off by the change.
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B. The Persistence of Industrial Policy-Making in
MERCOSUR'S Auto Industry
There is no divorcing the economics of the automotive
industry in South America from its industrial realpolitik.
Despite the seismic shift toward economic liberalization and
market reform, Brazil and Argentina are simply not willing to let
the market's invisible hand determine the fate of their
automobile industries. The political dynamic in Brazil and
Argentina-the strongly represented auto lobby and relatively
weakly represented consumer interests-requires politicians and
policy makers to pay close attention to the industry. Moreover,
vestiges of old-style industrial planning, particularly the focus on
quantity and production capacity rather than profitability,
persist and continue to drive policy. This emphasis on scale
economies will continue to lead to tinkering with producer
incentives through taxes and government programs. Thus, the
political economy of the industry will likely result in higher than
expected tariffs and continued use of NTBs. 1 It has been
suggested that the Brazilian government will not lower tariffs
and NTBs to imports until Japanese car manufacturers, the
wariest of foreign producers, invest locally in production
facilities on a scale that will require no imports.
MERCOSUR essentially has a balancing act to perform: keep
tariffs and NTBs high enough to keep local producers in business
but keep them low enough to promote foreign competition and
increased productivity at home. The McKinsey study concluded
that Brazil's proposed schedule of convergence to the CET.. will
encourage enough competition and increased productivity to
enable Brazilian automobiles to be cost-competitive with imports
from the United States and Japan at a CET of 20% in 2000.
However, given Brazil's unilateral increase in tariffs in 1995, one
would not expect Brazilian trade policy makers to sit idly by
should Brazilian producers fail to achieve international
competitiveness.
131. It has already been suggested that the MERCOSUR target common external
tariff of 20% will never be acceptable to Brazil because its producers would simply not be
competitive without greater protection.
132. See Trouble in El Dorado, supra note 61, at 58.




Trade among MERCOSUR's members and with non-
members has increased dramatically since 1991. Much of the
increase in intra-MERCOSUR trade is attributable to the
elimination or reduction in tariff and non-tariff barriers. The
increase in trade with the rest of the world is also due to the
reductions in trade barriers that grew out of trade liberalization
policies of the early 1990s. The pattern of member trade with
non-members in the automotive sector suggests that producers in
the automotive sector are not competitive with foreign producers
due largely to low labor productivity. Although productivity has
been improving, producers are not able to compete with foreign
producers without some form of protection.
Protection through tariff and NTBs is clearly not the optimal
policy prescription from an economic standpoint. Economic
efficiency would dictate that MERCOSUR simply open its
markets to non-member producers on a non-discriminatory basis
and let the market sort out comparative advantages. Moreover,
even if producers eventually achieve economies of scale and
global competitiveness, they will likely never recoup the losses in
social welfare that higher auto prices have imposed on
consumers. However, it must clearly be understood as a kind of
"second best" solution to a political economy that demands both
the existence of an auto industry and a continued role for
industrial planning of the industry. The liberalization of trade
with non-members and the subsequent flood of imports was
politically possible only because members, particularly Brazil,
saw the size of their protected markets grow. In light of this
industrial realpolitik and the extreme protection of the auto
industry by countries before 1991, MERCOSUR is surely a step






MERCOSUR 1995 Tariff Structure and
Final Common External Tariff (CET) (2001/2006) (percent)
Commodity Argentina Brazil Paraguay Uruguay Avg. Final
Agricultural 7.0 7.0 6.9 6.9 7.0 7.0
Mining 3.4 3.6 3.4 3.4 3.5 3.4
Manufacturing 10.8 12.3 9.6 11.1 11.0 11.5
Total 10.5 11.9 9.4 10.8 10.7 11.2
Note: CET to be completed by Argentina and Brazil in 2001 and by
Paraguay and Uruguay by 2006.
Source: SAM LAIRD, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, STAFF WORKING PAPER






World Intra- Extra- World Intra- Extra-
(US $b.) MERC MERC (US $b.) MERC MERCO
OSUR OSUR OSUR SUR
(%) (%) (%) (%)
1986 30.5 8.6 91.4 21.7 12.3 87.7
1987 34.1 7.4 92.6 24.1 10.8 89.2
1988 44.9 6.6 93.4 23.1 13.2 86.8
1989 46.5 8.2 91.8 26.1 15.1 84.9
1990 46.4 8.9 91.1 29.3 14.5 85.5
1991 45.9 11.1 88.9 34.3 15.3 84.7
1992 50.5 14.3 85.7 40.6 18.4 81.6
1993 54.1 18.5 81.5 48.1 19.6 80.4
1994 61.9 19.5 80.5 62.2 19.9 80.1
1995 70.0 20.5 79.5 79.9 18.1 81.9
Source: Derived from United Nations Comtrade statistics (on




Rate of Integrationa for MERCOSUR
Grouping 1980-90 1991-95 Changeb % Changec
World 1.1 13.1 12.0 1090%
MERCOSUR 2.4 24.7 22.3 929%
Rest of the World 0.9 11.0 10.1 1122%
a The rate of integration is the difference between rate of
growth in total trade and GDP growth.
b Variation between the two periods.
C Variation in percentage terms between the two periods.
Source: MARCELO OLARREAGA & ISIDRO SOLOAGA, WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION, STAFF WORKING PAPER ERAD-97-003,




MERCOSUR's Passenger Automobile Trade with Non-
Members
(US $ millions)
Exports Imports X+M X-M NER
(X) (M)
1987 1,519 67 1,586 1,452 0.92
1988 1,637 52 1,689 1,584 0.94
1989 745 52 797 693 0.87
1990 398 73 472 325 0.69
1991 195 296 491 -101 -0.21
1992 298 728 1,026 -429 -0.42
1993 243 1,201 1,444 -958 -0.66
1994 235 2,629 2,864 -2,394 -0.84
1995 212 3,628 3,840 -3,416 -0.89
1996 256 1,880 2,136 -1,623 -0.76
Source: Inter-American Development Bank, Intal





MERCOSUR's Share of World Automobile and Total
Exports
Share of World Share of Total Export Share
Year Auto Exports (A) Exports (B) Ratio (A/B)
1992 0.46% 1.31% 0.35
1993 0.48% 1.45% 0.33
1994 0.43% 1.46% 0.29
1995 0.33% 1.39% 0.24
1996 0.63% * *
*Data not available for this year




Extra-MERCOSUR Automobile Trade and Net Export
Ratio
For MERCOSUR Automobile Producers
Brazil Argentina
Year Net Exports NER Net Exports NER
(US $ millions) (US $ millions)
1987 1,523 0.989 -12 -0.206
1988 1,625 0.997 40 0.709
1989 1,975 0.987 32 0.586
1990 1,255 0.906 17 0.397
1991 936 0.703 -74 -0.453
1992 990 0.620 -449 -0.876
1993 361 0.187 -599 -0.922
1994 -614 -0.210 -1,452 -0.947
1995 -2,523 -0.576 -854 -0.894
1996 -433 -0.208 * *
*Disaggregated data for Argentina not available for 1996.




MERCOSUR's Trade in Automotive Parts and
Accessories with
non-Members 1987-96 ($ US millions)
X M X+M X-M NER
1987 500 470 970 31 0.03
1988 572 409 981 163 0.17
1989 606 386 992 220 0.22
1990 608 409 1,017 198 0.20
1991 612 481 1,092 131 0.12
1992 833 727 1,560 107 0.07
1993 881 971 1,852 -90 -0.05
1994 986 1,236 2,222 -250 -0.11
1995 1,039 1,326 2,365 -287 -0.12
1996 996 1,806 2,802 -809 -0.29




MERCOSUR's Share of World Automobile P&A and
Total Exports
Year Share of World Share of Total Export Share
P&A Exports (A) Exports (B) Ratio (A/B)
1992 1.38% 1.31% 1.06
1993 1.85% 1.45% 1.27
1994 1.86% 1.46% 1.27
1995 1.72% 1.39% 1.24
1996 1.75% * *
*Data not available for this year.




Extra-MERCOSUR Automobile P&A Trade and
Net Export Ratio
For Automobile P&A Producers
Brazil Argentina
Year Net Exports NER Net Exports NER
_ear ($ US millions) _ER ($ US millions) NER
1987 200 0.271 -163 -0.730
1988 234 0.290 -63 -0.379
1989 257 0.312 -30 -0.185
1990 214 0.252 -7 -0.042
1991 217 0.247 -67 -0.348
1992 337 0.302 -214 -0.502
1993 221 0.160 -294 -0.647
1994 144 0.085 -376 -0.751
1995 7 0.004 -273 -0.631
1996 -413 -0.183 -380 -0.716




Brazil's Proposed Automobile Tariff Schedule






Source: Compiled from various World Trade
Organization documents (1997) (on file with author).
Table 11
Production Shares of Major Automobile Producers in








t Volkswagen and Ford produced vehicles through their joint
venture Autolatina until 1997.
f Peugeot automobiles were produced by licensee Sevel until
1997.
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Source: IADB Intal Database.
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Source: Import data computed from the IADB Intal Database.
Tariff data computed from various sources of the World Trade
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Source: ASSOCIATION OF AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURERS (1996).
